DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION FOR PUBLIC GOODS How democracies create conditions for provisions of public goods by Eklöf Eriksson, Viktor
  
DEPTARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis: 30 higher education credits 
Programme: Master’s Programme in Political Science 
Date: 2019-08-07 
Supervisor: Marina Povitkina 
Words: 15611 
 
DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION FOR 
PUBLIC GOODS 
How democracies create conditions for provisions 
of public goods 
 
 
Eklöf Eriksson, Viktor 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
Purpose. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate if it is reasonable that democracies create 
conditions for provisions of public goods. Democracies are argued to create conditions for 
public goods provisions by aggregating citizens preferences through representation. But there 
is little empirical evidence in the literature that citizens preferences are represented in 
democracies. Hence, the research question: are citizens preferences represented by political 
representative actors in democracies? Methods. Climate change mitigation policies are used as 
a case for public goods in this thesis. Citizens’ preferences about whether they consider 
climate change a serious world problem are compared with how much parties devote to 
environmental protection in their party manifestos using a cross-section panel data analysis 
with fixed effects estimators. Climate change mitigation policies are argued to be found 
within the concept of environmental protection. Results. A significant positive relationship is 
presented between citizens’ climate change preferences with one-year lag and how much 
parties devote to environmental protection in party manifestos the same year as elections. 
Conclusion. With the findings, it appears realistic that citizens preferences are represented by 
political representative actors in democracies and with the theory in mind it appears 
reasonable that democracies create conditions for public goods provisions. 
 
Key words: Public goods, democracy, preference aggregation, representation, climate change 
mitigation  
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1. Introduction 
Calling for global school strikes, Greta Thunberg tries to bring political attention to the 
problem of climate change. She argues that those with political power have not been attentive 
enough to citizens’ concerns about the issue and many along with Greta Thunberg do not feel 
represented about their political preferences regarding climate change mitigation policies 
(CNN 2019; The Guardian 2019). These strikes and the sense of misrepresentation about 
preferences for climate change mitigation policies can be considered an outcry for provisions 
of public goods. Public goods are defined as benefits to everyone in societies that no one can 
be excluded from (Olson 1965). 
On the topic governance, there is an established literature comparing democracies with 
autocracies regarding provisions of public goods. Bättig and Bernauer (2016) concludes that 
democracies are in general better at supplying public goods related to climate change 
mitigation than autocracies. Deacon (2009) and Lake and Baum (2001) associated 
democracies with a higher provisions of roads, education, drinkable water, sanitation, and 
healthcare than autocracies. Barrett and Graddy (2000) and Neumayer (2002) argue that the 
political freedoms that come with democracy provide more environmental protection and 
commitment to dealing with environmental problems. In one way or the other, the common 
denominator in the literature democracies should create conditions for public goods 
provisions by accounting for citizens’ political preferences (see Bueno de Mesquita 2003; 
Dahl 1971, 1989; Deacon 2009; Fredriksson and Wollscheid 2007; Lake and Baum 2001; 
Neumayer 2002; Olson 1993). One of the more recognized democracy scholars, Robert Dahl 
(1989) argues that democracy aggregates the preferences of its citizens. In turn, it minimizes 
societal inequalities and maximizes the chances for public goods to be pronounced in a large 
pluralist society. The reason for this is that all preferences are weighed equally in 
democracies. When everyone is part of the decision process on an equal basis (as in the case 
of voting) there is a higher chance that decisions are made to benefit everyone and there is a 
lower risk of exclusion of citizens. The arguments around provisions of public goods by 
democracies follow a quite similar pattern - ‘In democracies, provision levels of public goods 
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are influenced much more strongly by the preferences of the median voter or, in a more open 
formulation, prevailing interests among the electorate’ (Bättig and Bernauer 2016: 286). 
The aggregation of citizens’ preferences would not be possible without representation of 
citizens preferences and citizens want to be represented because they want to have a say in 
decisions that concern their lives (Dahl 1971, 1989). Moreover, it is important for people 
because it is a form of contracting that provides stability to society as it minimizes the 
disagreements to decision-making (Pitkin 1967). Furthermore, it is argued that representation 
is made possible through the inclusive and competitive institutions that come with 
democracy; ‘elected officials’, ‘free and fair elections’, ‘inclusive suffrage’, ‘right to run for 
office’, ‘freedom of expression’, ‘alternative information’ and ‘associational autonomy’ (Dahl 
1989: 221). Citizens use these institutions to put pressure on political representative actors, 
such as parties (Dalton 1988; Neumayer 2002; Payne 1995; Weiss and Jacobson 1999).  
The above may seem as the way that democracy should work; citizens preferences are 
accounted for through representation and, in turn, aggregated to become the fundament for 
decision-making that allows for public goods provisions. However, in the above literature 
these principles of democracy are axioms used as theoretical point of departure to compare 
levels of public goods provisions between democracies and autocracies (e.g. Bättig and 
Bernauer 2016; Deacon 2009; Neumayer 2002). But no-one has so far shown that these 
principles work. To further explain, the literature connecting democracies to public goods 
provisions by, in one way or the other, using the arguments that citizens preferences are 
foundations for decision-making has not investigated whether citizen preferences really are 
represented in democracies. At least not to my knowledge. 
Furthermore, the above literature disregarded scholars that include the more sceptical views 
on democracy. For example, Achen and Bartels (2016) argue that citizens are not as 
politically informed as they are assumed to be. Arguably, being politically informed is 
important to put pressure on political representative actors. Moreover, Wren and McElwain 
(2009) claim that political representative actors often are unaware about citizens’ political 
preferences because preferences have become more individualized and therefore it is difficult 
to keep track on them. The literature supporting the assumption that democracies provide 
conditions for public goods provisions by aggregating preferences through representation 
does not consider that some public goods may be related to conflicted issues. Therefore, there 
are interests that compete and try to overrule one another. In the end it may be one preference 
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that is represented on the expense of another (Hix and Høyland 2011; Matland 1995). Climate 
change is an example of a conflicted issue where financial interests of oil businesses competes 
with political preferences for climate change mitigation policies (Mann 2016).  
With this in mind, it is under-researched whether citizens’ preferences are represented in 
democracies and this is the research gap that I intend to investigate with the research question: 
are citizens preferences represented by political representative actors in democracies? If 
citizens’ preferences are represented in democracies, they should be aggregated among 
political representative actors so that they may compose the foundational frameworks for 
decision-making to provide public goods. Hence, the general purpose is to investigate 
whether democracies create conditions for public goods. 
This is an important matter to investigate because it relates to the democratic legitimacy of 
political representative actors. Deriving from an attempt to define democratic legitimacy as 
‘government by the people’ and ‘government for the people’ (Scharpf 1999, Jagers et al. 
2016: 3), it is reasonable that political representative actors should be responsive to citizens’ 
preferences. If they are not, it would undermine both the term ‘government by the people’ by 
not representing citizens’ preferences and by not doing so political representative actors 
cannot deliver goods that are in line with the preferences of people and it is difficult to see 
how ‘government for the people’ should be applied. If there is no link between citizens’ 
preferences and what is represented by political representative actors, the assumption that 
democracy creates conditions for public goods provisions may lead to false conclusions about 
democratic legitimacy.  
In this thesis, I use climate change mitigation policies as a case for representation of public 
goods. Climate change is a conflicted issue that has competing interests related to climate 
change mitigation policies (Mann 2016). Moreover, climate change exists in all countries and 
is politically addressed with climate change mitigation policies. Climate change mitigation 
policies are considered public goods because they provide benefits that are free for everyone 
to enjoy.  
I execute the investigation with the help of a cross-section panel data regression using fixed 
effects estimators. In the investigation, I attempt to connect citizens’ preferences about 
whether they consider climate change a serious world problem and the degree to which parties 
devote their party manifestos to environmental protection. Climate change mitigation policies 
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should be found within the concept of environmental protection. The findings show a 
significant positive relationship between citizens’ preferences about climate change one year 
before elections and how much parties devote to environmental protection in their party 
manifestos. With the logic of the theory, parties increase their emphasis on climate change 
mitigation policies in their party manifestos to represent citizens. I conclude that there is a 
realistic possibility that political representative actors represent citizens’ preferences in 
democracies. The assumption that democracies create conditions for public goods provision 
seem reasonable from with the findings given in this thesis. 
I structure the following parts in this thesis into five sections. In section two, I present the 
purpose and research question. In section three, I clarify concepts and delimit the thesis to the 
sole use of parties as referring to political representative actors. But more importantly, I 
present the existing literature as theory on why citizens’ preferences should be expected to be 
represented in democracies creating conditions for public goods provisions. In the end of the 
section, I present possible challenges to this expectation. In section four, I start by presenting 
the case of climate change and climate change mitigation policies. Furthermore, I present my 
research design along with the variables used to conduct the regression. In section five, I 
present the results in the form of a regression and by evaluating it. In section 6, I conclude.  
2. Purpose and research question 
The literature suggests that democracies create conditions for public goods provisions because 
citizens’ preferences are aggregated by political representative actors and it would not be 
possible without representation. But there is little empirical evidence that citizens’ preferences 
are represented by political representative actors. Therefore, the purpose is to investigate if it 
is reasonable that democracies create conditions for public goods. To proceed with this 
purpose, I seek to answer the research question: 
- Are citizens’ preferences represented by political representative actors in 
democracies? 
3. Existing literature and theory 
To initiate this section, I define the concepts of public goods along with political preferences 
and interests. Moreover, I delimit the study to the use of national parties as refereeing to 
political representative actors (See section 3.1) 
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The thesis problem is founded on the literature claiming that the principles of democracy 
creates conditions to provide public goods and this is done by preference aggregation through 
representation. Therefore, I present the theory by describing the previous literature (See 
section 3.2). 
Furthermore, since representation of citizens’ preferences is an assumption that is put to the 
test in this thesis, I proceed by arguing for why political representative actors may not be 
representing citizens’ preferences. (See section 3.3) 
3.1 Definitions and delimitations 
3.1.1 Public goods 
Mancur Olson (1965) defines public goods as goods that are non-excludable from anyone and 
provide a collective benefit to everyone. Public goods are important for a society, because 
they give a sense of inclusion among citizens. That is, society is not meant to benefit just a 
small set of citizens, but rather the larger portion or the whole population (Kallhoff 2014).  
This is a widely used definition of public goods (e.g. Bättig and Bernauer 2016; Deacon 
2009) and it is the definition I use in this thesis. 
3.1.2 Political preferences and interests. 
Preference is defined as ‘the fact that you like something […] more than another thing […]’ 
(Cambridge Dictionary n.d.). A political preference should be when someone prefers a 
political option over another. Furthermore, interests are defined as ‘the feeling of wanting to 
give your attention to something […]’ (Cambridge Dictionary n.d.). A political interest should 
be when someone wants to give attention to a political issue or solution. These words are 
commonly used in the literature, even though they never seem to be defined. However, they 
appear to refer to the same thing. Namely, political attitudes or opinions that are given more 
attention by citizens than others (see Bättig and Bernauer 2016; Hix and Høyland 2011; Salas, 
McCall Rosenbluth, and Shapiro 2016). Since they appear to refer to the same thing, I use 
these words interchangeably because it allows me to preserve some of the original terms, such 
as preference aggregation and competing interests. 
3.1.3 Parties as political representative actors 
In previous century, politics have been characterized by parties in both new and old 
democracies (Mair 1995). Even though criticised as ‘mischief of faction’ (Dalton and Weldon 
2005: 932, referring to Ignazi 1996), parties have been so influential in democracies that the 
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expression ‘party government’ has been coined (Dalton and Weldon 2005; Mair 1995; 
Rohrschneider and Miles 2015). In a sense, it is almost difficult to talk about democracy 
without talking about parties. Furthermore, there is a stark majority of citizens in advanced 
industrial democracies who hold the perception that it is unthinkable to have democracy 
without parties (Dalton and Weldon 2005). 
Reasonably parties are important actors in democracies, why I refer to parties as political 
representative actors. 
3.2 Why democracies should be expected to create conditions for 
public goods provisions by preference aggregation through 
representation 
3.2.1 Democracy as a basis for legitimacy 
For any society, legitimacy is a fundament to maintain stability. Illegitimate decision-making 
by public officials is to be considered as rule by force and shall be opposed by citizens. With 
continuous illegitimate rule there is a risk of violence - ‘legitimacy provides them [the citizens 
subjected to power] with moral grounds for cooperation and obedience’ (Beetham 2013: 26). 
In this respect, legitimacy translates into accepting an authority to have the right to exercise 
power. Legitimacy by itself is desirable in any state, at least to some degree to maintain 
stability (Beetham 2013; Tyler 2006). 
However, legitimacy takes a broader shape in democracies. Democracy translates into the rule 
of the people suggesting that authority ideally should lie in the hands of the citizens. 
Legitimacy should be seen as an end goal where the state is meant to serve the citizens 
(Beetham 2013; Dahl 1971). An attempt to define democratic legitimacy in this context is 
‘government by the people’ and ‘government for the people’ (Scharpf 1999, in Jagers, Matti, 
and Nordblom 2016: 3). Government by the people aims at the input legitimacy where 
citizens present their preferences through elections and appoint parties. For the citizens, 
voting is a matter of giving away the power to make decisions. It is to be equated with saying 
who should have the rightful ability to exercise power. Government for the people aims at 
output legitimacy considering what citizens receive back from governance. To become 
legitimate, the citizens must be convinced that decisions are made for their benefit (Jagers, 
Matti, and Nordblom 2016). This is important for citizens to accept, as well as, to trust the 
ruling parties as legitimate decision-makers when they have given away power to make 
decisions. 
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Considering that citizens must be convinced that decisions are made to their benefit, the right 
foundations for decision-making must be generated. In the next section, I explain how this 
foundation is generated and why it is public goods that aspire to be the product that is 
providing citizens with benefits. 
3.2.2. Preference aggregation makes democracies legitimate 
Preference aggregation is the democratic process from which the foundation for decision-
making is generated. Benefits to citizens are made possible from the outcome of this process. 
To explain the concept, citizens have preference profiles that are sets of preferences. 
Preference aggregation occurs when preference profiles are merged into one social preference 
and it is this social preference that is the foundation for decision-making (Austen-Smith 
2009). Normally this is done through voting for the party that matches ones preference profile 
to greatest degree - ‘The voting choice between parties aggregates the individual preferences 
of the electorate for political leadership, thereby converting public opinion into specific 
political decisions’ (Dalton 1988: 127). For citizen to vote, parties must represent citizens. It 
is this representation of political preferences that is aggregated. The political platform to 
which the preferences are aggregated does not imply an absolute aggregation of preferences. 
It is only the most prevalent, or common preferences that are accounted for by parties since 
preferences may be too many and parties cannot represent for all preferences citizens hold 
(Austen-Smith 2009; Easton 1957).  
Public goods are products of preference aggregation because the most prevalent, or common 
preferences are represented and preferences among citizens are weighed equally. When 
everyone is part of the decision process on an equal basis (as in the case of voting) there is a 
higher chance that decisions are made to benefit everyone and there is a lower risk of 
exclusion of citizens. This strongly refers to the provision of what is defined as public goods 
(Austen-Smith 2009; Dahl 1971, 1989) – goods that are not excludable from anyone and 
provide benefits to everyone (Olson 1965) 
Preference aggregation constitutes the ground before decision-making in a democracy. That 
is, preferences are aggregated into the social preference from which political decisions are 
made. Public goods should come as natural products from decision-making since it is the 
most prevalent preferences that are represented by parties altogether and all preferences are 
weighed equally. Through the perspective of preference aggregation, democracy appear to be 
legitimate – it adopts citizens’ preferences and turns them into public goods that assumedly 
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are accommodated by as many citizens as possible. However, it is still possible to wonder 
why parties should aggregate citizens’ preferences in the first place. I provide an answer to 
this in the next section.  
3.2.3. Accountability as a reason for preference aggregation 
Expressed by Mancur Olson (1993), parties in democracies cannot be driven by self-interest, 
which is most likely the case by leaders under an autocratic and authoritarian rule. It would 
put democratic parties in position where they face the risk of being replaced. If democratic 
parties want to keep their positions, they must provide public goods for their citizens in the 
best way possible (Olson, 1993). More specifically, political parties are held accountable to 
voters and consequently parties account for citizens interests (Barrett and Graddy 2000; Bättig 
and Bernauer 2016; Deacon 2009; Neumayer 2002; Payne 1995). Accountability is therefore 
a key property of democracy that should ensure that parties provide public goods.  
But accountability is only possible if democratic inclusive and competitive institutions are 
provided to society (Dahl 1971, 1989; Deacon 2009). These institutions are ‘elected officials’, 
‘free and fair elections’, ‘inclusive suffrage’, ‘right to run for office’, ‘freedom of expression’, 
‘alternative information’ and ‘associational autonomy’ (Dahl 1989: 221). The mentioned 
institutions are used in the literature as theoretical reasoning when investigating the 
democratic performance. For example, it is argued in Neumayer (2002) and Payne (1995) that 
freedom of expression and a broad range of information contributes to informed citizens who 
form preferences. In turn, citizens put pressure on parties through organisation and 
mobilisation when they can associate freely. If citizens are not satisfied with the rule, they 
elect another party or create their own party. 
These democratic institutions create competition for political office and provide a larger 
electorate than in autocracies. There is competition because the cost (e.g. punishment or 
violence) for removing a party from office is low (Lake and Baum 2001) and the electorate is 
larger than autocracies because everyone are able to participate. Parties in democracies must 
therefore convince a large part of the population of their worthiness to hold legitimate 
decision-power while competing with other parties. In autocracies, parties must at the very 
most convince a small elite. Accordingly, representation becomes inevitable to gain citizens 
support (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). Parties must represent citizens to convince them about 
parties’ worthiness to hold legitimate decision-power. Representation is why citizens’ 
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preferences are aggregated by parties and in turn why democracies should provide public 
goods. 
3.2.4 Representation as a precondition for legitimacy and preference aggregation 
As Hanna F. Pitkin would define representation ‘[…] a substantive acting for others’ (Pitkin 
1967: 209), it is reasonable to wonder why representation matters to citizens. 
To answer this, one of the more established aspects of representation is that it has a liberal 
property. As Robert Dahl (1971; 1989) argues in his work about democracy, citizens want to 
be included in decisions that concern their own lives, and this is a matter of self-realisation. 
Representation is just like that. It is the foundation for being the voice for citizens interests, 
where citizens strive for self-fulfilment (Pitkin 1967).  
Yet, the liberal idea of representation for self-realisation may appear as an ideological 
conviction. To further argue for the point, there are several examples in history where icons or 
citizens have come to speak for others without mandate. ‘Nobody elected Bono […]’ (Dryzek 
and Niemeyer 2008: 481), neither did anyone elect Emma Watson, nor Greta Thunberg. But 
these citizens represent discourses that make sense to citizens. This kind of representation 
works to ensure that citizens have a voice when citizens are unable to be part of the 
deliberative conversation that affects their lives. But more importantly, citizens agree to the 
unelected representation (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008) and, in the same way, citizens should 
agree to the parties they elect. 
It is telling that citizens want to be represented for reasons that concern their own lives. 
Furthermore, it is related to legitimacy – the lack of a voice that aims to fulfil citizens’ 
preferences could lead to low acceptance and to low trust in parties. This is because it is 
unlikely that parties pick up on citizens’ preferences when they do not listen to citizens, and 
therefore it is unlikely that parties work for the citizens. In the long run, it may lead to 
instability (Beetham 2013). But, in a democratic society it seems more likely that these parties 
do not receive citizens’ votes.  
Furthermore, according to Thomas Hobbes, representation has a mediating effect for the 
stability within a society which can be directly linked to what is said about support for a 
political system. The worst-case scenario for Hobbes, is what he calls the state of nature. It 
entails everybody’s war against each other – a state where there is complete anarchy and there 
is no trust. The social contract may be the most recognized tool of Hobbes to pave the way 
13 
 
out of the state of nature, but a little less known instrument discussed in his work the 
Leviathan is representation. Hobbes suggested that representation is a way of contracting that 
creates a commonwealth. The commonwealth is when everyone agrees, and one can represent 
everyone as if the actions of one where the actions of them all. It minimizes disagreement to 
decision-making and maintains stability. Citizens want to be represented because it entails 
stability to society (Pitkin 1967). With the same logic, the actions of parties should be viewed 
as the actions of them all. Parties gain support by convincing citizens that they act on citizens’ 
behalf that they will provide citizens with benefits. 
With accountability and the above reasoning about representation, there should be a causal 
link between the interests of citizens and what is accounted by parties in democracies (see 
figure 1.). Intuitively, parties cannot aggregate citizens’ preferences without representing 
citizens. Moreover, citizens want to be represented because it is a matter of self-realisation 
and because it minimizes the disagreement about decision-making and maintains stability, 
making representation a precondition for legitimacy. 
 
Figure 1. Representation as a mechanism for what is accounted for by parties 
Deducing from the above, it is possible to say that representation is a mechanism for what is 
accounted for by parties. Moreover, it is a key for parties to become elected as parties try to 
convince citizens about their worthiness to rule. Consequently, it is the preferences that 
parties represent that are aggregated into the social preference which is the foundation for 
decision-making within democracies. To this thesis representation serves as a theoretical basis 
for why citizens interests should affect parties who aggregate them, creating conditions for 
public goods. 
3.3. Challenging the view about citizens’ preferences being 
represented in democracies 
3.3.1. The behaviour of citizens and voters 
The literature claiming that the democracies create conditions for providing public goods by 
aggregating preferences through representation may appear to be an ideal type on how 
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democracy should work. One objection to the this view of democracy is that it requires 
‘instrumentally rational, enlightened, politically aware, and issue-orientated voters making 
independent reasoned choices among candidates and parties’ (Dryzek, 1990: 168-169). But 
there is little evidence that voters should be as informed as assumed (Ashworth and Bueno de 
Mesquita 2014). Yet, voters still vote, and parties are still accountable. It would be 
unreasonable to think that citizens vote randomly, so there must exist some form of 
representation by parties. However, Cristopher Achen and Larry Bartels (2016) argue that 
citizens are more likely to use their identities when they vote rather than their preferences. For 
example, citizens vote for parties that historically have been associated with a certain social 
class because they identify themselves with it. Additionally, citizens vote with use of smaller 
sets of information they have collected about parties over the years. But these sets of 
information are often basic without specific details about party policies. Meanwhile, what the 
parties actually represent in specific issues about public goods is not a determinant for what 
citizens use when they vote (Achen and Bartels 2016; Lupia 1994). Therefore, parties may 
represent their own interests, or the interests of someone else and this questioning the view 
about accountability. 
Another argument that may stand in opposition to the representation of citizens is that the 
connection between parties and citizens has changed. Historically, there has been a strong 
connection between citizens and parties, where parties have been sources to political 
information and education (Lipset and Rokkan 1990). Today, political information is easily 
accessible through other sources than parties. Moreover, the level of education has increased 
in democracies and citizens are not as dependent on parties as they once have been. As a 
result, preferences have become more individualised than before. This is problematic because 
it becomes harder to detect citizens’ preferences. Consequently, it becomes harder to 
represent citizens’ preferences (Dalton and Weldon 2005; Mair 1995; Wren and McElwain 
2009). Thus, preference aggregation where the most prevalent preferences are represented 
appears less likely. With this argument, parties represent preferences, but there are possible 
gaps where no party represent a specific preference that could possibly be common among 
citizens.  
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Individualised preferences are argued to have caused old mass parties to start changing their 
party programmes and move towards centre of the socio-economic left-right scale1 where they 
think they may appeal to as many voters as possible. But moving to the centre of the scale 
involves giving up on some of the initial, or core voters, because the preferences represented 
in the centre are not compatible with the preferences represented on any of the end of the 
scale (Dalton and Weldon 2005; Mair 1995; Wren and McElwain 2009). The representation 
of the initial voters is lost when parties are insecure about where citizens political interests lie. 
Even if parties would reach out to a broader audience at the centre of the left-right scale, the 
citizens with preferences towards the ends of the scale are not represented and these citizens 
together may be a large part of the population. 
On the other hand, new parties enter the political competition as they take advantage of the 
situation by addressing issues that are not addressed by the old mass parties. This is especially 
more frequently seen in proportional systems (Wren and McElwain 2009). These new parties 
certainly represent some citizens as they are seen to be growing, but there is no research 
saying that these parties accurately are filling the gaps where the old parties do not represent.  
3.3.2. Conflicted issues and competing interests 
What is never mentioned in the literature arguing that citizens’ preferences are represented in 
democracies and, in turn, creating conditions for public goods is that interests may compete 
with each other. There may be issues where most citizens agree to a solution with the same 
goal, yet it is argued by Simon Hix and Bjørn Høyland (2011) that interests from one group of 
citizens often are opposed by another group of citizens in a pluralist society. 
Conflict occurs when the objectives within democratic societies are clashing. Moreover, 
conflict occurs when there is disagreement on how an issues should be solved even though the 
objectives are settled among groups of citizens (Matland 1995). It is a plurality of 
understandings about objectives and solution that makes citizens interests compete with each 
other. 
When preferences are aggregated the most prevalent preferences should be represented. So, 
competing interests appear not to be a problem for representation in a democracy at first sight. 
 
 
1 Where parties on the left side of the scale have represented workers’ interests and parties on the right side of 
the scale have represented capitalist interests (Lipset and Rokkan 1990). 
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But when interests compete against each other one interest tries to diminish the other 
(Matland 1995). In these cases, it is often small groups of citizens that are represented in the 
end. The reason is that it is easier for small groups to mobilize and organise their preferences, 
while larger groups suffer from difficulties to coordinate their preferences into one uniform 
preference (Olson 1965, in Hix and Høyland 2011). With this argument, it should be easier 
for parties to represent the interests of small groups when citizens’ preferences are generally 
hard to detect. Parties listen to the smaller groups because they are able to clearly express 
their preferences. There is a risk that the interests of smaller groups of citizens override the 
interests of larger groups of citizens and it is the smaller groups that are represented by 
parties. 
Moreover, citizens’ interests are not always in line with the interests of businesses or lobbies. 
Conflict of interest does not necessarily occur between the interests of citizens, it may as well 
be between citizens interests and the interest of interest groups e.g. businesses, lobbies, social 
movements organisations, and unions (Ainsworth 2019; Burnstein and Linton 2002; Mair 
1995). The literature presenting the arguing for preference aggregation and representation of 
citizens does not account for the influence of these actors. 
If there is a low degree of understanding about what parties specifically stand for, parties may 
be able to act above the heads of citizens. Parties are still accountable to citizens, but this 
should provide some room for interest groups to get their interests represented by parties. But 
why would parties represent someone else than citizens, or their own interests? Interest 
groups often provide some form of benefit to parties, this can be information or help with 
public relations. Not to mention that some countries allow interest groups to fund 
electioneering communication or whole election campaigns (Ainsworth 2019). Parties are 
accountable to citizens, but they may balance the interests of citizens with the interests of 
interest groups as payback to interest groups. 
4. Research design 
In the first part of this section, I explain that I use climate change mitigation policies as a case 
for public goods to proceed with the investigation. Here, I argue for why climate change 
mitigation is a public good and why it is a prevalent interest among citizens. I anchor climate 
change to the theoretical framework where parties should represent citizens’ preferences. 
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Moreover, I explain why citizens’ preferences about climate change mitigation may not be 
represented (See section 4.1.). 
In the second part of this section, I explain the course of action. This is a description how I 
proceed with the investigation. This part contains a description of the operationalization, the 
hypothesises, and a description on the regressions that I use (See section 4.2.). 
In the final part of this section, I present a description of the variables along with variable 
diagnostics. Furthermore, I present limitations of the data that I use (Section 4.3.). 
4.1. The case of climate change and representation of climate change 
mitigation policies 
In this thesis, investigate climate change mitigation policies as a case of public goods. 
Climate change has become a problematic phenomenon in recent decades. Increasing amounts 
of greenhouse gases are emitted into the atmosphere causing the global temperatures to rise. 
Consequently, there are changes to the climate, e.g. extreme weather including storms and 
droughts, as well as melting glaciers, forest fires and a general rise in sea-levels. With a 
continuing rise in global temperatures, climate change may have devastating effects to 
humankind (Mann 2016). It seems reasonable that many citizens should be concerned about 
the seriousness of climate change, therefore it is important to investigate the representation 
climate change mitigation policies as public goods. 
The definition of public goods involves goods that no one can be excluded from and everyone 
can benefit from (Olson 1965). Climate change mitigation policies are difficult to exclude 
anyone from and everyone can benefit from them if they are implemented. For example, it is 
not only some citizens who enjoy the effects policies against greenhouse gas emissions from 
factories, but everyone. Therefore, climate change mitigation policies are public goods that 
can be provided by states. 
The climate is a useful case because it is not tied to any borders. Moreover, climate change is 
something that can be considered a problem in most countries. To further explain by 
comparing it with another public good, not all democracies experience problems with the lack 
of streetlights and therefore less citizens have preferences about streetlights because they are 
taken for granted. But climate change may be something that worries citizens in most 
democracies. A majority of the respondents answered that the impacts of climate change will 
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be bad in a report from the European social survey in 2018 (ESS 2018). Moreover, 75% of 
survey respondents in the U.S.A., along with 73 % in Russia and 87 % in Canada perceive 
climate change to be a serious problem that will have dangerous consequences (Weber 2010). 
These findings are consistent with the ones in other articles (e.g. Leiserowitz et al. 2013; 
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006). Therefore, there is a possibility that climate change mitigation 
policies are prevalent interests among citizens. 
Previous research about parties’ representation of climate change mitigation policies has 
concluded that climate change mitigation policies is an ideological matter for parties. Parties 
to the left of the ideological left-right scale seem to represent climate change mitigation 
policies to a further degree than parties to the right (Farstad 2018). More so, climate change as 
a concern along with support for environmental protection policies appear to be an ideological 
matter for citizens with the same patterns as parties. Citizens to the left are more concerned 
about climate change and are more in favour of pro-environmental protection policies than 
citizens to the right (Harring, Jagers, and Matti 2017; Tobler, Visschers, and Siegrist 2012). 
Moreover, preferences on environmental protection has been connected with political 
representation in study conducted in the U.S.A. by Johnson, Brace, and Arceneaux (2005). 
Tjernström and Tietenberg (2008) finds that democracies where more citizens have 
preferences concerning the seriousness of climate change are associated with lower levels of 
greenhouse gases.  
All the above literature is relatable to the representation of citizens’ preferences concerning 
climate change. It seems reasonable that there should be a representative connection when 
citizens and parties to the left are more concerned about climate change and would like to see 
more climate change mitigation policies. Moreover, the study by Johnson, Brace, and 
Arceneaux (2005) may not specifically talk about climate change mitigation policies, but 
climate change mitigation policies comprised within the concept of environmental protection. 
What is interesting is that this study connects citizens preferences with political representation 
similar to what I intend to do in this thesis. Though, the study is only conducted within some 
states of U.S.A. and has not and is therefore not generalized over democracies. Even though, 
preferences about the seriousness about climate change are relates to less greenhouse gas 
emissions in Tjernström and Tietenberg (2008), they do not connect preferences to actual 
policies or party representation in democracies. 
19 
 
I provide a contribution to the above literature by analysing the connection between citizens 
preferences and the party representation of climate change mitigation policies. By analysing 
this gap, I also aim to fulfil the purpose of this thesis; investigating whether it is reasonable 
that democracy creates conditions for public goods provisions through preferences 
aggregation by representing citizens. 
If climate change mitigation policies are prevalent interests among citizens in democracies, 
these interests should also be represented in democracies. Reasonably, citizens want to be 
represented with climate change mitigation policies because climate change is an issue that 
can impact on their lives, or, with an altruistic sense, impact the lives of others to whom one 
can relate. Citizens preferences about climate change mitigation policies are weighed equally 
with other prevalent preferences in a democratic society and parties must represent citizens’ 
preferences because they will otherwise put themselves in the risk of losing their power. 
Therefore, prevalent preferences about climate change mitigation policies are aggregated. 
Moreover, the more prevalent the preferences about climate change mitigation policies the 
more they are represented by parties. In the end, conditions for climate change mitigation 
policies as a public good are created. 
On the other hand, climate change is a conflicted issue and climate change mitigation policies 
have competing interests. For example, some businesses have an interest in undermining 
citizens’ interests for climate change mitigation policies. The reason is that citizens’ interests 
are not in line with the financial interests of businesses from e.g. fossil fuel industries, food 
industries, pharmaceutical industries, etc. Climate change mitigation policies may involve 
loss of revenue or costs for interest groups because such policies often entail measures such as 
tax or switch to renewables energies. Counteractions are taken to silence the interests of those 
who would like to see more climate change mitigation policies such as campaign-funding and 
providing parties with information that can be of benefit. Furthermore, these interest groups 
are known to mobilize small groups such as climate change deniers to attack representatives 
of climate change mitigation policies (Ainsworth 2019; Anderson 2009; Grundmann 2007; 
Mann 2016; Pidgeon 2012). These are all mentioned challenges to the representation of 
citizens’ preferences. Parties bay balance the representation of citizens with representing the 
interests of e.g. the fossil fuel industry if this interest group provides parties with benefits. 
Moreover, small groups such as climate change deniers could possibly hamper the 
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representation of citizens preferences since they are a small group that can easily organize 
into one uniform preference. 
He [James Hansen, scientist at NASA] said that ‘in my opinion the greenhouse effect 
has been detected, and it is changing our climate now’. […] He was soon attacked by 
sceptics who described the whole issue as a ‘global warming scare’. Sceptics gained 
enormous visibility given their relatively small number (Grundmann 2007: 419) 
4.2. Course of action 
In this thesis, I attempt to draw a link between citizens’ interests for public goods and what is 
accounted for by by parties in democracies. I argue that representation is the mechanism for 
whether parties account for citizens’ interests. To further explain, the more prevalent the 
interest among citizens is for specific public goods, the more parties should emphasise on 
these by representing citizens’ interests. 
The purpose is to be able to generalise whether it is reasonable that democracies provide 
conditions for public goods provisions by preferences aggregation through representation. 
The main reasoning why this should be, is that parties are accountable to citizens and citizens 
want to be represented. Therefore, parties must represent citizens. Altogether, parties 
aggregate the most prevalent preferences among citizens into a social preference. Since 
everyone’s preference weighs equally in democracies it is likely that the most prevalent 
preferences among citizens, are those who benefit everyone, and everyone can enjoy. In the 
end, conditions for public goods provisions are created. 
I use climate change mitigation policies as a case of a public goods in which there may be a 
prevalent interest among citizens in democracies. According to the model, parties should be 
more prone to talk about climate change mitigation policies if more citizens have an interest 
for them and this to be considered a sign of representation.  
Though, there are no data on citizens’ interests about climate change mitigation policies, but it 
is still possible to investigate parties’ representation of citizens considering climate change 
mitigation policies. The Eurobarometer provides data about citizens’ preferences on whether 
they consider climate change a serious world problem (European Commission 2018). These 
data can be compared with how much parties devote their party manifestos to environmental 
protection. Environmental protection is a concept that includes climate change mitigation 
policies (Volkens et al. 2018). If there are more citizens who consider climate change a 
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serious world problem, parties may devote more of their party manifestos to environmental 
protection. Possibly, parties are representative to citizens’ preferences regarding climate 
change mitigation policies; it seems reasonable that few people are interested in climate 
change mitigation policies without considering climate change a problem. This is how I 
structure this investigation and the hypothesis follows: 
H1 The more citizens who consider climate change a serious world problem, the more parties 
devote party manifestos to environmental protection 
Carrying out the investigation, I use a regression analysis to display the increase or decrease 
in a dependent variable with the increase in one or more independent variables. For example, 
if there is an increase in the percentage of citizens who regards climate change as a serious 
problem, there may be an increase in the percentage devoted to environmental protection in 
party manifestos. Due to the formation of the data used in this thesis and to increase the 
sample size, I conduct a cross-section panel data analysis since the observations for party 
manifestos are coded by election year, and data on whether citizens consider climate change a 
serious problem is retrieved from cross-section data that is collected every second year. 
Additionally, I use a fixed effects models within the frames of panel data analysis. Fixed 
effect provides the advantage of reducing the problem with omitted variable bias, where one 
or more unmeasured variables are influencing the variables in the regression models. By using 
fixed effects any omitted variable that has a constant value over time is acknowledged by 
putting all omitted variables into one variable. This is because fixed effects models subtract 
the observation values for each time point in each country in all variables with the average 
observation value across time points in each country for all variables. If a variable does not 
vary over time, the variable will end up with the same value on both sides of the subtraction. 
Consequently, these variables take themselves out and therefore they are accounted for, so 
that they do not influence the other variables in the model (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017). 
This is beneficial since I am not able to control for all the variables that may affect the 
prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos. 
Since the purpose of this thesis is to examine whether democracy provides conditions for 
public goods provisions through representation, I want to be able to generalise over 
democracies. Therefore, I aggregate the values for party manifestos to the mean percentage 
for each country and year. The same thing is done with preferences about climate change, 
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where I receive the percentage of citizens in each country and year who considers climate 
change serious world problem. This is also necessary, because panel data analysis requires 
respondents to be fixed over time (Bernard et al. 2011; Deaton 1985). Countries are fixed 
over time, while citizens in the survey data used and parties in countries are not.  
On the topic of generalization over the democracies, I am restricted to the EU-member states 
since I use the Eurobarometer. Though, I do not consider this to be a problem, because a large 
portion of the world’s advanced democracies are located within the EU.  
I use an exclusionary strategy where I add control variables onto a focal relationship (the 
relationship between the main independent variable and the dependent variable). The control 
variables create noise to rule out uncertainty about the significance of a focal relationship. To 
further explain, suppose that the focal relationship is significant in a bivariate regression (a 
regression with only the dependent and one independent variable). If there is no significant 
relationship left when the control variables are applied onto the focal relationship it is further 
unclear whether the significance of the focal relationship is true. The significance of the focal 
relationship can only be estimated as likely if the significant relationship persists and estimate 
does not remotely differ in magnitude2 from previous regression models (Aneshensel 2013). 
Moreover, since I argue that citizens are not aware of what parties stand for in specific issues 
in the existing literature and theory, I conduct interaction on whether the effect of climate 
change preferences is contingent on more public political engagement. When citizens vote, 
they tend use their identity, such as whether they are from the working class or if they are 
academics. Moreover, they use reasoning about simple information they have collected about 
parties over the years. But the knowledge about where parties stand in specific issues is low. 
This may be problematic for the accountability of parties. Though, these are generalisations 
made on data primarily conducted within the borders of the U.S.A. (Achen and Bartels 2016). 
However, there are societies where citizens are more engaged in politics than others. 
Intuitively, political engagement should provide citizens with more knowledge where parties 
stand in specific issues. Therefore, I include an investigation on whether a possible 
relationship between more citizen preferences regarding the seriousness of climate change 
 
 
2 Magnitude refers to coefficients in the regressions. 
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and how much parties devote to environmental protection in party manifestos is contingent on 
more public political engagement. 
H2 The correlation between more citizens who consider climate change a serious world 
problem and parties devoting party manifestos to more environmental protection is 
contingent on more public political engagement among citizens  
In this thesis, I include six fixed effects regression models. Model 1 and 4 are bivariate 
regression models with the focal relationship. Thus, they are presenting the separate 
correlation in countries over time between the percent of citizens who consider climate 
change a serious problem and how much parties devote to environmental protection in party 
manifestos. Model 2 and 5 are multivariate regression models where control variables are 
included to rule out any spurious significance that may have been presented in the bivariate 
regression models. In model 3 and 6, I include the interaction term, where I examine a 
possible interaction effect between citizens’ attitudes about climate change and public 
political engagement on how much parties devote their party manifestos to environmental 
protection. 
If there is any causality between citizens’ preferences and what parties represent in their party 
manifestos, it is reasonable that citizens’ preferences occur before parties change their 
manifestos. Taking this into account, I present the first three models with independent 
variable data from the previous year (See model 1, 2 and 3) and in the last three models I use 
independent variable data from two years before (See model 4, 5 and 6). These lags enables 
me to control for whether there is a correlation between the representation of environmental 
protection in party manifestos and data for all the independent variables in previous years 
(Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017).  
The regressions are simply explained by a unit increase in the value of one or more 
independent variables (x) followed by an increase or decrease in the dependent variable (y) 
with the value of the coefficient (β). The constant (β0) is the value of the dependent variable 
(y) when the independent variable (x) is equal to 0. εit is the error term representing 
unobserved variables that vary over time. αi is the error term representing the unobserved 
variables that hold constant values over time. The independent variables are examined within 
each country (i) and in each year (t). The lagged effects are presented with either -1 for one-
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year lag, or -2 for two-year lag (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017). The interaction terms are 
marked by parenthesises around the independent variables that are included. 
To explain the interactions, values of observations in the focal independent variable are 
multiplied with values of observations in the interaction variable (moderating variable). When 
the product is compared with the values of observations in the dependent variable it enables 
an estimated interaction coefficient seen in front of the parenthesises in model 3 and 6. The 
interaction coefficient presents how much the correlation coefficient between the focal 
independent variable and the dependent variable increases or decreases with the unit increase 
in the interaction variable.  
To calculate the effect of the interaction on the dependent variable, the coefficient value given 
by the focal independent variable is either added or subtracted with the value of the 
interaction coefficient, which is multiplied with the unit of the interaction variable. Addition 
is used if the interaction coefficient is positive and subtraction is used if the interaction 
coefficient is negative (Aneshensel 2013).  
Coefficient of focal independent variable +/- (Interaction coefficient * Unit of interaction 
variable) = Change in dependent variable 
For example, if the coefficient given by the focal independent variable is equal to 2, the 
interaction coefficient is equal to -3 and there is a 2 unit increase in the interaction variable, 
the change in the dependent variable is equal to -4, (2-(3*2) = -4). 
Regression coefficients are fitted estimates of observations plotted over the values of 
independent variables compared with the values of a dependent variable. The estimates are 
either positive as they increase, or negative as they decrease. However, I consider the 
estimates non-significant if the estimates are neither positive nor negative with a probability 
greater than 0.1. The reason is that I cannot claim with 90% certainty that the coefficient is 
not equal to 0, and it is further unknown whether the non-significant independent variable has 
any positive or negative correlation with the dependent variable. Therefore, I only accept 
estimates that are not equal to 0 with 90% confidence. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          (1) 
meanofenvir1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑣𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑥3𝑖,𝑡−1 +     (2) 
𝛽4𝑥4𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑥5𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑥6𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑥7𝑖,𝑡−1 + +𝛼𝑐 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡 
meanofenvir1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑣𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑣2𝑥_𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑚𝑎𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝑓ℎ𝑝_𝑚𝑐𝑒𝑖5𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5v2x_polyarchy𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑣2𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑥3𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑥4𝑖,𝑡−1 +     (3) 
+𝛽5𝑥5𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑥6𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑥7𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑥7𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8(𝑥1𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑥7𝑖,𝑡−1) 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
meanofenvir1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑣𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑣2𝑥_𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑚𝑎𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝑓ℎ𝑝_𝑚𝑐𝑒𝑖5𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5v2x_polyarchy𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑣2𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽8(𝑎𝑣𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑣2𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          (4) 
meanofenvir1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑣𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝑥3𝑖,𝑡−2 +     (5) 
𝛽4𝑥4𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽5𝑥5𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽6𝑥6𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    
meanofenvir1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑣𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝑣2𝑥_𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝑚𝑎𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2 +
𝛽4𝑓ℎ𝑝_𝑚𝑐𝑒𝑖5𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽5v2x_polyarchy𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽6𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽7𝑣2𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−2 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝑥3𝑖,𝑡−2 +     (6) 
𝛽4𝑥4𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽5𝑥5𝑖,𝑡−2 + +𝛽6𝑥6𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽7𝑥7𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽8(𝑥1𝑖,𝑡−2 ∗ 𝑥7𝑖,𝑡−2)  +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
meanofenvir1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑣𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝑣2𝑥_𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝑚𝑎𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2 +
𝛽4𝑓ℎ𝑝_𝑚𝑐𝑒𝑖5𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽5v2x_polyarchy𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽6𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽7𝑣2𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−2 +
𝛽8(𝑎𝑣𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡−2 ∗ 𝑣2𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−2) + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
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Figure 2. Visual of the models, including the focal relationship, the disturbance of 
control variables pointing to the focal independent variable and the dependent variable, 
and the interaction variable pointing between the focal independent variable and the 
dependent variable  
4.3. Modelling the variables and diagnostics 
4.3.1. The focal relationship 
Prevalence of environmental protection (Dependent variable) – meanofenvir1 
The dependent variable measures the mean of how much parties in each year of parliamentary 
election in each country assign to environmental protection in their party manifestos. Climate 
change mitigation policies should be included in the concept of environmental protection 
(Volkens et al. 2018). Therefore, if citizens’ preferences about climate change correlates with 
how much parties devote climate change mitigation policies in party manifestos, there is a 
chance that there is an increase to how much is devoted to environmental protection in party 
manifestos. 
The dependent variable data is collected from the Manifesto Project’s Comparative Manifesto 
Database. Experts have coded content of party manifestos into the proportion of how much 
parties assign to each political subject (Facchini, Gaeta, and Michallet 2017; Werner, 
Lacewell, and Volkens 2014). The purpose is to provide the possibility to ‘[study] the 
programmatic supply of parties’ (Manifesto Project n.d.). This is useful for my thesis because 
it provides quantified data on what parties aim to supply. 
Originally, the variable measures the percentage of how much each party devotes to 
environmental protection in their manifestos in each year of parliamentary election (Facchini, 
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Gaeta, and Michallet 2017). Yet, I want to generalise over democracies why I aggregate the 
values of all parties in each country and year of election by the mean. Thus, the data points 
are by country and year, but the original scale from 0 to 100 is preserved. 0 means no 
environmental protection in party manifestos and 100 means that party manifestos are entirely 
devoted to environmental protection. 
One of the countries in the comparative manifesto database, Greece, had two elections in 
2012. This is not compatible with the data that I merge because the merged data has only one 
observation for each country and year. To solve this, I create a grand mean for the two 
elections in 2012. 
Percentage of 'Climate change is a serious problem' (focal independent variables) - avsercc 
The focal independent variable measures whether citizens consider climate change one of the 
most serious world problems, aggregated by EU member state and year. 
The variable is collapsed from two variables questions. The first is asking what respondents 
consider the most serious world problem. The respondent must choose between several 
possible world calamities where climate change is one of the options (See table 1 in appendix 
for the other choices). The second is asking if there is any other of the options that the 
respondent would consider a serious problem (European Commission 2013, 2017). 
Respondents having to choose between what they consider the most serious world problem is 
beneficial for this thesis, because it puts preferences about climate change in competition with 
other preferences. Combining it with a follow up question, the variable detects whether the 
respondent really feel that climate change is a serious problem. It is therefore likely that it 
should be an outspoken interest among citizens if there is a pronounced part of the population 
who consider it to be a concern. Consequently, it is something that parties should emphasise 
more in their manifestos if hypothesis 1 is right. 
The variable is initially coded as a dummy on an individual level (European Commission 
2013, 2014, 2017, 2018; European Commission and European Parliament Brussels 2017). I 
aggregate these individual responses to the percentage of citizens who considers climate 
change a serious problem within each country and year. The observations are at this point 
country per year on an interval scale from 0 to 1. 0 means no respondents consider climate 
change a serious problem and 1 means that all respondent consider climate change a serious 
problem. 
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The Eurobarometer started their collection of data on global warming and climate change in 
2008. Since then, data has been collected in 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017 (European 
Commission 2013, 2014, 2017, 2018; European Commission and European Parliament 
Brussels 2017). Consequently, there is only data from every second year from 2009 and 
onwards. Meanwhile, the comparative manifesto database presents manifesto data from 
elections between these years. This is problematic for a small-N dataset since data points are 
lost. To fill the gaps, I let the values from the Eurobarometer be valid for the following year 
where there is no data. For example, the value from 2009 makes up the missing values for 
2010. 23 cases were missing data points were filled.  
The data is collected through face-to-face interview surveys. The ideal sample size is 1000 
respondents per country. 27718 respondents were interviewed in all EU-member states in the 
survey collected in May to June in 2015 (European Commission 2018). The Eurobarometer 
may provide reliable observations on climate change preferences for each country and year as 
the number of respondents is high. 
To make a suggestion about the estimation of the variable, attitudes about climate change 
should be positively correlated with prevalence of environmental protection in party 
manifestos if the variable is significant. To further argue, in the theoretical framework it is 
suggested that parties should be representative to citizens’ interests. In this way the parties 
should be receptible to citizens’ preferences considering climate change as a serious problem, 
in their manifestos. 
4.3.2. Control variables and interaction variable 
The control variables are used to create noise to examine whether the significance of the focal 
relationship persists. The interaction variable is used to examine whether the effect of the 
percent of citizens consider climate change a serious problem on the prevalence of 
environmental protection is conditional to the public political engagement. 
Using the Varieties of Democracy-dataset from 2018 (V-Dem), I control for political 
corruption and the level of democracy. Political corruption and the level of democracy are 
both variables that may affect the deliberative discussion among citizens, whether parties 
choose to listen to the citizens and the ability to hold parties accountable. If a country is 
highly corrupt or less democratic, citizens may be less inclined to express their thoughts 
because they would not be able to affect political decisions anyway. Additionally, there are 
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few incentives for parties to listen to citizens because they are not accountable to voters. In 
corrupt societies, parties tend to put more attention their own interests, and/or the interests of 
elites who provide benefits or hold them in power (Bueno de Mesquita 2003; Olson 1965, 
1993). In previous research, more democratic countries have been associated with better 
conditions for environmental protection (e.g. Fredriksson and Wollscheid 2007; Neumayer 
2002). Therefore, I expect there to be a positive relationship between higher levels of 
democracy and the prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos. Moreover, 
environmental protection is often not the first interest among parties and the elites in corrupt 
countries (Rafaty 2018). Reasonably there should be a negative correlation between more 
political corruption and the prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos. 
Political corruption is measured with the political corruption index (v2x_corr) and the level of 
democracy is measured with the electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy). Both variables 
are measured on an interval scale from 0 to 1, where 0 means less corrupt and less democratic 
and 1 means highly corrupt and highly democratic (Coppedge et al. 2018; McMann et al. 
2016; Teorell et al. 2016).  
Furthermore, I control for ‘Economic influence over media content (2008-2016)’ (fhp_mcei5) 
(Teorell et al. 2019: 293) and real GDP/capita (mad_gdppc). Economic influence over media 
content relates to whether interest actors have an economic influence over media content. 
Reasonably, if such actors have control over media, they can provide benefits to parties by 
giving room for campaigns and diminish others. Therefore, parties balance the interests of 
citizens with interests of actors proving parties with benefits (Ainsworth 2019; Mann 2016). 
Moreover, it is possible that these actors direct questions that parties must answer to in 
interviews and debates. Consequently parties adjust their manifestos to answer to these 
questions (Strömbäck 2011; Strömbäck and van Aelst 2013). Possibly, this can disturb the 
representative relationship between parties and citizens. 
As a proxy for the economic situation within each country and year, real GDP/capita may 
become a distraction for parties which is relatable to a competing interest. Parties may put 
more focus on repairing the economy when it is weak. Possibly, this may compromise with 
how much parties devote to environmental protection in party manifestos even though most 
citizens’ consider climate change a serious problem (Anderson 2009; Fairbrother 2013; Kim 
and Wolisnky-Nahmias 2014; Rohrschneider and Miles 2015).  
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These variables are found in the 2019 Quality of Government time-series dataset (QoG). 
‘Economic influence over media content (2008-2016)’ (Teorell et al. 2019: 293) is originally 
retrieved from Freedom House. The variable presents itself on an interval scale between 0 and 
20, where 0 means that there is no economic influence on media content and 20 means that 
there is very much influence on media content (Freedom House 2018; Teorell et al. 2019). 
Real GDP/capita is originally retrieved from the Maddison Project Database from 2018 
(Maddison Project Database version 2018 2018; Teorell et al. 2019). 
In the models, I include the year as a control for any event that may be influential to the 
prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos in each country and election year, 
as well as, the year before the election (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017). Year is retrieved 
from QoG (Teorell et al. 2019) 
Continuing to the interaction, I use public political engagement as a moderating variable 
(v2dlengage). If citizens are further politically engaged, they should be more politically aware 
and more inclined to hold parties accountable in specific political matters. Therefore, a 
positive correlation between preferences about climate change and how much parties devote 
to environmental protection in party manifestos is contingent on public political engagement. 
This moderating variable is included as a control variable in model 2 and model 5. The 
variable is organised on an interval scale between -5 to 5. Towards -5 means less public 
political engagement among citizens and towards 5 means more political engagement among 
citizens. This scale is standardized, suggesting that the mean of original data lies somewhere 
around 0. The variable is collected from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). 
4.3.3. Diagnostics of variables 
There are outliers with high leverage and deviation in both the models. More specifically, 
they are further away from the main cluster of observations (See graph 8 to 11 in appendix) 
(Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017). Some of these observations are influential to the estimates 
of the regression models. These are Sweden, Portugal, Netherlands and Greece in the one-
year lagged models (See graph 6 in appendix), and Greece Portugal and Sweden in the two 
year lagged models (See graph 7 in appendix). To deal with these observations, I use robust 
regression to weigh these observations with the other observations in the data. This 
counterbalances their influential effects (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017). 
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In panel data analysis, heteroscedasticity is often a problem. It means that the variance among 
observations is less fitted in one of the ends of one or more variables. To further confirm that 
this is a problem, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test is significant, meaning that there is 
a problem with heteroscedasticity in a model without robust standard errors. But, because I 
use robust standard errors this is already accounted for (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017). 
The data is unbalanced suggesting that some data points are missing when there is no data for 
all countries in every time unit (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017). This comes natural since 
countries do not hold election every year and it is something that I cannot correct. 
4.3.4. Limitations of the data 
In the dependent variables, I use data that is based on content. Content data can face criticism 
because it is coded with subjective interpretations. Even though coders follow a content 
categorisation matrix, hesitations may occur when a sentence is not specifically aimed at 
something (Gemenis 2013). For example, it is difficult to interpret whether a party urges for 
more renewable energy because it is environmentally friendly, or because it serves an 
economic end, or both (Farstad 2018). Yet, the comparative manifesto database is widely used 
and recognised for research about party programmes (e.g. Allen and Bara 2019; Close 2016; 
Kostadinova 2015), why I choose to rely on it. 
The Eurobarometer used for the focal independent variable is built on data from face-to-face 
interviews. Face-to-face interviews face possible risk of biased responses as a product of 
interaction between the interviewer and the respondent compared to normal survey 
questionnaires. For example, the respondent’s answer may depend on how the questions are 
presented by the interviewer, where language-use can have a deciding influence (Suchman 
and Jordan 1990). Nonetheless, the Eurobarometer is commonly used in research (see Meyer 
2016; Schmitt 1989; Wallace and Pichler 2007) and I consider it a reliable dataset in this 
thesis. 
As described earlier about the variable “percentage of 'Climate change is a serious problem'”, 
data points from the Eurobarometer in the previous year are used to fill in the gaps where data 
points were missing in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. It is questionable whether the data really 
is transferable from one year onto the upcoming year – preferences may change to the next 
year because of critical junctures such as migration or economic fluctuations. I acknowledge 
that there is a risk that estimates are presented as non-significant because values of the 
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observations filling in missing data may not be consistent party manifestos in years that I 
measure. However, in a small-N study it is necessary to make use of as many observations as 
possible. Therefore, I choose to proceed by using data in the “percentage of 'Climate change 
is a serious problem'” from previous year.  
5. Results 
In the first part of this sections, I present the results by describing the main regression table 
(table 1.). Furthermore, I display and describe marginal effects plots concerning the results of 
the focal relationship (figure 4. and 5.) and the interaction (figure 6. And 7.) (see section 5.1.).  
In the second part of this section, I discuss the implications of the results. I answer to the 
hypothesis and the research question, as well as, discuss what the results mean to the purpose 
of the thesis. Moreover, I reason around the significance of other variables (see section 5.2.). 
In the third part of this section, I present an additional estimation. As the results appear to 
provide significant focal independent variables closer to elections, I test if the focal 
relationship is significant in the same year as elections (see section 5.3.). 
In the final part of this section, I discuss limitations to the results (see section 5.4.). 
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5.1. Description of results 
 
Table 1. Fixed effects regression estimates of the prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos with one-year lag and two-year lag on 
independent variables  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
VARIABLES Prevalence of Environmental protection in party manifestos 
Percentage of 'Climate change is a serious problem', 1-year lag 13.547*** 19.415*** 13.374**    
 (2.596) (6.240) (5.615)    
Political corruption index, 1-year lag  -12.882*** -15.438***    
  (4.100) (5.378)    
Real GDP per Capita, 1-year lag  -0.0004 -0.0004    
  -0.0003 -0.0003    
Public political engagement, 1-year lag  -0.114 -2.512    
  (0.769) (2.239)    
Economic influence over media content (2008-2016), 1-year lag  -0.459* -0.473*    
  (0.229) (0.233)    
Level of democracy, 1-year lag  -29.538*** -28.824***    
  (8.447) (8.633)    
Year, 1-year lag  0.073 0.127    
  (0.302) (0.326)    
Percentage of 'Climate change is a serious problem' 1-year 
lag##Public political engagement, 1-year lag   4.338    
   (3.736)    
Percentage of 'Climate change is a serious problem', 2-year lag    4.751 6.042 3.987 
    (3.895) (5.704) (4.067) 
Political corruption index, 2-year lag     -16.690** -17.803* 
     (6.964) (8.881) 
Real GDP per Capita, 2-year lag     -0.0004 -0.0004 
     -0.0003 0.0003 
Public political engagement, 2-year lag     1.459* 0.667 
     (0.790) (2.195) 
Economic influence over media content (2008-2016), 2-year lag     -0.702 -0.709 
     (0.432) (0.441) 
Level of democracy, 2-year lag     -35.109** -34.051*** 
     (13.344) (11.904) 
Year, 2 year lag     0.000 0.014 
     (0.342) (0.363) 
Percentage of 'Climate change is a serious problem', 2 year 
lag##Public political engagement, 2 year lag      1.575 
      (3.709) 
Constant -1.680 -107.666 -212.474 2.348 48.160 21.672 
  (1.254) (599.293) (644.982) (1.914) (672.716) (713.326) 
Observations 57 57 57 52 52 52 
Within-R2 0.318 0.462 0.48 0.061 0.206 0.208 
Number of countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Referring to table 1, the “percentage of ‘Climate change is a serious problem’” is presented to 
have significant estimates in all of the models with one-year lag (p<0.01 in model 1 and 2. 
p<0.05 in model 3). Moreover, political corruption index (p<0.01), economic influence over 
media content (2008-2016) (p<0.1), and level of democracy (p<0.01) are significant in model 
2 and 3.  
For a whole step on the scale (0 to 1) on the percentage of citizens who considers climate 
change is a serious problem, the prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos 
increases by 13.55 percentage points (SE: 2.59) in the bivariate model 1. In model 2, the the 
focal independent variable is followed by an increase in the prevalence of environmental 
protection in party manifestos by 19.41 percentage points (SE: 6.24), and 13.37 percentages 
(SE: 5.61) in the multivariate model 3.  
In the opposite direction, the prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos 
decreases by 12,88 percentage points (SE: 4.1) for a whole step on the scale (0 to 1) on the 
political corruption index in model 2, and 15.44 percentage points (SE: 5.3) in model 3. 
Similarly, the prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos decreases by 29.54 
percentage points (SE: 8.44) with a whole step on the scale (0 to 1) on the level of democracy 
in model 2. Moreover, a whole step on the scale on the level of democracy is followed by a 
decrease in the prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos by 28.82 
percentage points (SE: 8.63) in model 3. Regarding “Economic influence over media content 
(2008-2016)”, one step on the scale between -5 and 5 decreases the prevalence of 
environmental protection in party manifestos by 0.45 percentage points (SE: 0.22) in model 2 
and 0.47 percentage points (SE: 0.23) in model 3. 
Even though the coefficient for the “percentage of ‘Climate change is a serious problem’” 
increases in the multivariate model 2 compared with the bivariate model 1, it does not 
drastically change the results when the control variables are added into the model. I consider 
it a drastic change if the coefficient changes direction, goes from very small to very large, or 
from very large to very small. The coefficients presented in model 1, model 2, and model 3 
are consistently large. Therefore, the focal relationship appears to be steady. This increases 
the chances that the correlation between the percentage of citizens who consider ‘Climate 
change is a serious problem’ and the prevalence of environmental protection in party 
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manifestos is true. Because the control variables used do not appear to disturb the 
relationship. 
In the first three models, the variance explained within each country (within-R2) is rather 
high. The first model has a within-R2 value of 0.318, the second model has a within-R2 value 
of 0.462, and the third model has a within-R2 value of 0.48. It means that the variance 
explained within countries is 31.8% in model 1, 46.2 % in model 2, and 48 % in model 3. 
Since the first model already has a high within-R2 it seems reasonable that the percentage of 
citizens who consider ‘Climate change is a serious problem’ accounts for a large portion of 
the within-R2 in model 2 and 3 as well. With this reasoning, the percentage of citizens who 
consider climate change a serious world problem seem explain much of the variance for the 
prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos in each country. 
Proceeding to the last three models with two-year lag on the independent variables. The focal 
relationship is not significant in nether model 4, model 5, nor model 6. However, political 
corruption index (p<0.05 in model 5. p<0.1 in model 6) and the level of democracy (p<0.05 in 
model 5. p<0.01 in model 6) remain significant. Moreover, public political engagement is 
significant (p<0.1) as a control variable in model 5. 
With the whole step on the scale (0 to1) for the political corruption index, the prevalence of 
environmental protection in party manifestos decreases by 16.7 percentage points (SE: 6.96) 
in model 5, and 17.80 percentages (SE: 8.88) in model 6. Similarly, the prevalence of 
environmental protection in party manifestos decreases by 35.11 percentage points (SE: 
13.34) with a whole step on the scale (0 to 1) for level of democracy in model 5 and decreases 
by 34.05 percentages (SE: 11.90) in model 6. On the other hand, for each step on a scale (-5 
to 5) for public political engagement, the prevalence of environmental protection in party 
manifestos increases by 1.46 percentage points (SE: 0.79). 
Since the focal relationship is not pointing to any significant correlation, it is still unknown 
whether there is a relationship between the percentage of citizens who considers climate 
change a serious world problem and the prevalence of environmental protection in party 
manifestos in the models with 2-year lag. However, the models where the control variables 
are included appear to have within-R2 values of moderate degree. Model 5 presents a within-
R2 value of 0.206 and model 6 presents a within-R2 value of 0.208. Meaning that the 20.6 % 
of the variance is explained within countries in model 5 and 20.8 % of the variance is 
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explained within countries in model 6. Yet, only 6.1 % of the variance is explained within 
countries (within-R2 value of 0.061) in the bivariate model 4. 
The coefficients for the percentage of citizens who consider climate change is a serious world 
problem are somewhat difficult to interpret if they are not put into context. One unit increase 
for this variable means an increase over the whole scale as the scale goes from 0 to 1. It is 
similar to going from 0 % to 100 %. Countries with either 0 % or 100 % citizens who 
considers climate change a serious world problem seems unlikely. It is more likely that 
observations fall in between. To further clarify these coefficients, I divide them by 100. It 
means that a one-unit increase, e.g. going from 9% of citizens who considers climate change a 
serious world problem to 10%, is followed by an increase in the prevalence of environmental 
protection in party manifestos with 0.194 percentage points in model 2 and 0.135 percentage 
points in model 1. This is further shown in figure 3 and 4. Figure 3 is the marginal effects 
plots of model 2 when all the other variables are held at their mean values. Figure 4 is the 
same but for model 5. In figure 3, the difference between 30 % (0.3) of citizens who considers 
climate change a world problem and 40 % (0.4) is a 1.94 percentage point increase on the 
prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos. In figure 4, the difference 
between 30 % (0.3) of citizens who considers climate change a world problem and 40 % (0.4) 
is a 0.6 percentage point increase on the prevalence of environmental protection in party 
manifestos. Moreover, it is possible to see the that the relationship is non-significant in model 
5 as the confidence intervals are overlapping each other. 
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Figure 3. The effect of the percentage of citizens who considers climate change is a serious world 
problem with one-year lag on the prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos 
within countries 
  
Figure 4. The effect of the percentage of citizens who considers climate change is a serious world 
problem with two-year lag on the prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos 
within countries 
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Considering the interaction models (model 3 and model 6), none of the interactions are 
presented as significant in table1. It indicates that it is still unknown if citizens must be 
politically engaged for parties to account for citizens’ preferences about climate change. This 
is further visualised in the marginal effects plots in figure 5 and figure 6. The relationship 
between the “percentage of ‘Climate change is a serious problem’” and the prevalence of 
environmental protection stays the same with the unit increase of public political engagement. 
This is seen at values of 30% and 80% of citizens who consider climate change a serious 
problem where the confidence intervals are overlapping. 
 
Figure 5. Marginal effects plot. One-year lag interaction between the “percentage of 
‘Climate change is a serious problem’” and the level of public political engagement on 
the prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos 
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Figure 6. Marginal effects plot. Two-year lag interaction between the “percentage of 
‘Climate change is a serious problem’” and the level of public political engagement on 
the prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos 
5.2. Implications and discussion 
The results present a positive relationship between percentage of citizens who considers 
climate change a serious world problem and the prevalence of environmental protection in 
party manifestos in the models with one-year lagged independent variables (the first three 
models). Therefore, the first hypothesis is given support in the one-year lagged models; The 
more citizens who consider climate change a serious world problem, the more parties devote 
party manifestos to environmental protection.  
On the other hand, there is no significant correlation between the percentage of citizens who 
considers climate change a serious world problem and the prevalence of environmental 
protection in party manifestos in the models with 2-year lagged independent variables. 
Therefore, it is not possible to lend support to the first hypothesis with the results in the 2-
year lagged models. Perhaps the observations in the two-year lagged models are too far back 
in time from the election year to provide a significant correlation. The degree of how much 
parties devote to environmental protection in party manifestos may have moved during the 
time period. 
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However, to connect the one-year lagged models to the broader theoretical context of this 
thesis, I answer to the research question:  
- Are citizens’ preferences represented by political representative actors in 
democracies? 
There appears to be a connection between citizens’ preferences and what is represented by 
parties in democracies with the case of climate change mitigation policies. With humbleness 
about that this concerns only one case of representation, there seems to be support for claim 
that citizens’ political preferences are represented by political representative actors in 
democracies.  
With the theory in mind, there seems reasonable that democracies provide conditions for 
public goods provisions because citizens appears are represented and aggregated among 
parties. When preferences about climate change are common among an increasing number of 
citizens, parties appear to put more emphasis on environmental protection where climate 
change mitigation policies are included. Citizens want to be represented about climate change 
mitigation policies because climate change is a matter that concerns citizens’ lives. Parties 
represent climate change mitigation policies because they are accountable to voters. 
Moreover, parties want to prove their worthiness for holding political power by representing 
citizens’ preferences. By representing citizens. preferences about climate change are 
aggregated by parties. When more citizens consider climate change a problem and want 
climate change mitigation policies, it should be more common among parties to put more 
emphasis on climate change mitigation policies in party manifestos. In the end, climate 
change mitigation policies are within the frames of what can be provided as public goods. 
Therefore, it appears reasonable that democracies create conditions for provision of public 
goods by aggregating preferences through representation. 
Reviewing the control variables, the level of democracy is presented with a negative 
correlation with the prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos throughout 
the models. This is a surprise, because more democratic countries are generally associated 
with more environmental protection than less democratic ones (e.g. Fredriksson and 
Wollscheid 2007; Neumayer 2002). It is difficult to say what may be the reason for this. 
Perhaps, parties in more advanced democracies represent more interests in general than 
parties in less advanced democracies. Therefore, environmental protection takes up a smaller 
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portion of party manifestos; when the level of democracy increases the prevalence of 
environmental protection in party manifestos decreases due to the plurality of subjects in 
manifestos. 
Moreover, political corruption is presented to be negatively correlated with the prevalence of 
environmental protection in party manifestos. This was expected because in corrupt societies, 
parties tend to represent their own interests, and/or the interests of elites who promote parties. 
Environmental protection is often not a top priority among corrupt parties and the elites 
supporting them (see Rafaty 2018). 
In the models with one-year lag, economic influence over media content is presented with a 
significant negative correlation with the prevalence of environmental protection in party 
manifestos. Again, it is difficult to say why, because there are many things that can influence 
media content with financial means. But, departing from what I have reasoned around this 
variable, economic influence comes from interest actors. It possible that parties adjust their 
manifestos to questions they must face in media interviews and debates. Therefore, there 
could be less emphasis put on environmental protection in party manifestos in cases where 
there is a financial influence on media content from actors who do not have an interest for 
environmental protection. 
Public political engagement is positively correlated with the prevalence of environmental 
protection in party manifestos in the two-year lagged model where control variables are 
introduced. Intuitively, public political engagement does not make citizens want more climate 
change mitigation policies or environmental protection by itself. But if there is a prevalent 
interest among citizens for climate change mitigation policies or environmental protection and 
citizens are politically engaged, citizens may put pressure on parties regarding these interests. 
However, neither of the models with interactions between citizens’ preferences considering 
climate change a serious world problem and the public political engagement within countries 
present a significant correlation with more prevalence on environmental protection in party 
manifestos. It is still unknown whether citizens’ preferences about climate change related to 
prevalence environmental protection in party manifestos are contingent to public political 
engagement. From this perspective it is unclear why there is a positive significant correlation 
between more public political engagement and the prevalence of environmental protection 
party manifestos. With this said, I cannot give support to the confirm the second hypothesis: 
The correlation between more citizens who consider climate change a serious world problem 
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and parties devoting party manifestos to more environmental protection is contingent on more 
public political engagement among citizens. 
5.2.1. Additional estimations 
Considering that the focal relationship is presented as significant in the one-year lagged 
models while the two year-lagged models are not presented as significant, it is interesting to 
examine whether there is a significant relationship models without lag. Possibly, the focal 
relationship is significant closer in time to elections. 
In table 2, I present the models without lag. However, in these models I cannot use the 
variable regarding how much media content is influenced by economic interests. The variable 
presents a too high variance inflation factor (VIF above 5) (table 3 in appendix), meaning that 
this variable does not present a coefficient that is separate from the other variables to a 
sufficient degree in these models (multicollinearity) (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017). 
Instead, I use a variable on whether interest groups are allowed to fund broadcasted election 
campaigns to replace the loss of the variable (v2elpaidig. See appendix table 1 for description 
and table 4 for variance inflation factor) (Coppedge et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). If 
interest groups can provide benefits to parties when they are allowed to fund election 
campaigns, parties may balance their representation of citizens with representation of interest 
groups. It becomes a distraction to the representation of citizens’ preferences. The reason why 
this variable is not used in the lagged models is because it does not provide enough 
comparable observations to the other variables with lag. 
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Table 2. Regression models without lags 
  1 2 3 
VARIABLES Prevalence of Environmental protection 
        
Percent of 'Climate change is a serious problem' 5.565 6.114 9.892 
 (3.271) (4.799) (8.321) 
Political corruption index  -1.456 -2.028 
  (10.297) (10.308) 
Real GDP per Capita  0.00006 0.00009 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Broadcasted campaigns funded by interest groups  -0.897 -0.871 
  (0.853) (0.852) 
Public political engagement  0.436 1.721 
  (0.954) (3.337) 
Economic influence over media content (2008-
2016)    
    
Level of democracy  -2.009 -1.943 
  (14.765) (15.006) 
Year  -0.028 -0.054 
  (0.236) (0.259) 
Percent of 'Climate change is a serious 
problem'##Public political engagement   -2.421 
   (5.147) 
Constant 2.322 57.638 107.741 
 (1.603) (477.770) (518.543) 
    
Observations 54 54 54 
Within-R2 0.0545 0.0863 0.0923 
Number of countries 27 27 27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
Reviewing table 2, none of the models present significant estimates. It is difficult to say why 
this is, but perhaps parties do not have time to update their manifestos to the events occurring 
the same year as elections. Up to now, it is only the one-year lagged models that provide a 
significant focal relationship.  
However, in all the models used so far in this thesis, I have restricted the number of 
observations so that cases are comparable over the variables in all the models with the same 
lag. Naturally it decreases the number of observations when variables have missing data 
points. But the focal relationship presents a different result in bivariate model without lag 
when I remove the restrictions of cases (table 3). With an increase in observations the focal 
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relationship turns significant (p<0.1) with a positive coefficient of 5.87 percentage point over 
the whole scale (0 to 1). The more citizens who consider climate change a serious problem, 
the more parties devote their party manifestos to environmental protection. Yet, the variance 
explained within countries is low (Within-R2= 0.0652) and I cannot control for any untrue 
significance since there are no control variables included. Therefore, I am cautious about 
drawing any further conclusions about this bivariate model. Though, the result is still 
interesting for future research when more data is available, because there may still be a 
chance that the models with data from the same year are presented as significant. 
Table 3. Regression of the focal relationship not restricted to comparable 
cases with other independent variables 
  1 
VARIABLES Prevalence of Environmental 
protection 
    
Percent of 'Climate change is a serious problem' 5.874*  
(3.339)   
Constant 2.003  
(1.625)   
Observations 62 
Within-R2 0.0652 
Number of countries 27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
5.2.2. Limitations of the results 
The results present large standard errors for the variable “percentage of ‘Climate change is a 
serious problem’”. This is somewhat problematic because the actual observations are far away 
from the predicted estimate and there is higher risk that the estimates are less representative to 
the population of countries. It is possible that this is due to the small number of observations 
(Kellstedt and Whitten 2013). However, since the data only allows for an investigation 
between a constrained set of data points in the dependent variable that are comparable to the 
data in the independent variable, a small number of observations must be tolerated in this 
thesis.  
Moreover, parties are in some cases argued to affect citizens’ political knowledge (Lau and 
Redlawsk 2007; Lupia 1994). Parties may have affected citizens to consider that climate 
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change is a serious problem in previous year. Thus, there may be a relationship where parties 
affect citizens’ preferences about climate change, and not citizens’ preferences affecting 
parties. In this thesis, I cannot provide a further answer than that there appears to be a 
connection between citizens preferences and how much parties devote to environmental 
protection in party manifestos. 
Furthermore, citizens with concerns about climate change may also correlated with concerns 
about other environmental matters that are unmeasured in this thesis. This is a possible 
problem for the results. Parties may increase their emphasis on environmental protection in 
party manifestos because of other environmental preferences that citizens hold along with 
their preferences about climate change. Therefore, there is a risk that it is not climate change 
mitigation policies that is increased in party manifestos, but other environmental protection 
policies. While more data is needed in order to control for other environmental preferences, I 
can only assume that it is citizens’ preferences about climate change that are represented by 
parties. 
Even if parties talk more about climate change mitigation policies in party manifestos when 
more citizens consider climate change a serious problem, the quantity of what parties say in 
their manifestos does not speak of the quality. For example, a party may be very concise 
about what they say regarding climate change mitigation policies and only need a small part 
of the manifesto to represent citizens’ preferences. On the other hand, climate change is a 
complex problem that overlaps into many societal discussions. To argue for the point, the 
more parties talk about climate change mitigation, the more solutions they present. 
An additional limitation to the results; all the lagged models contain data from the previous 
year. As I described in the research design, I let the values from the Eurobarometer in 2009, 
2011, 2013 and 2015 be valid for the following year where there initially was no data. 
Therefore, the one-year lagged variable for the “percentage of 'Climate change is a serious 
problem'” contains some data points from two years back and the two-year lagged variable for 
the “percentage of 'Climate change is a serious problem'” contains some data points from 
three years back.  
The prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos during a year of election may 
be inconsistent with the data on the “percentage of 'Climate change is a serious problem'” 
from three years back and some of the data from two years back. Consequently, there are too 
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many inconsistent observations in the independent variable to correlate with dependent 
variable. Perhaps this is a reason why the two-lagged models are presented as non-significant. 
Meanwhile, the prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos during a year of 
election may be consistent with some other observations from two years back and many of the 
observations from one year back in the independent variable the “percentage of 'Climate 
change is a serious problem'”. This may be a reason why the one-year lagged models are 
presented as significant. 
With this reasoning, it is difficult to say how well the two-year lagged independent variable 
“percentage of 'Climate change is a serious problem'” would have correlated with the 
prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos if data had been available for all 
years. Therefore, more data is needed to further investigate the significance of the focal 
relationship in the two-year lagged model. 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose throughout this thesis has been to examine whether it is reasonable that 
democracies create conditions for public goods provisions. The purpose is based on the 
assumption that citizens’ preferences are aggregated through representation by political 
representative actors in democracies. It is the aggregation of represented preferences that is 
the foundation for decision-making. This is what should create conditions for public goods 
provisions. I have examined this by asking:  
- Are citizens’ preferences represented by political representative actors in 
democracies?  
There appears to be support that citizens’ preferences are represented by political 
representative actors in democracies. There is a significant positive relationship when 
analysing the party representation of climate change mitigation policies in the relations to 
citizens’ preferences one year before elections about climate change as a serious problem. 
In the existing literature it is argued that democracies are better suited to provide public goods 
than autocracies because citizens preferences are aggregated for decision-making. This is 
made possible through representation of citizens preferences. These preferences must be 
represented because political representative actors are accountable with the inclusive and 
competitive institutions that come with democracy (see Bättig and Bernauer 2016; Bueno de 
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Mesquita 2003; Dahl 1971, 1989; Deacon 2009; Neumayer 2002; Olson 1993). Although, this 
literature has also disregarded to put the mechanism of representation to the test. This thesis 
contributes with support to the understanding that citizens preferences are represented in 
democracies and, further, that these preferences are aggregated by political representative 
actors. With the literature in mind, it seems reasonable that democracies create conditions for 
public goods provisions because it is citizens’ preferences that are the foundation for 
decision-making.  
This is an important result because it connects of democratic legitimacy. Reasonably, political 
representative actors represent what they perceive citizens to prefer. Since the aggregation of 
preferences creates the foundation for decision-making, it appears more likely that citizens are 
convinced that decisions are made for their benefit. The suggested definition of democratic 
legitimacy as ‘government by the people’ and ‘government for the people’ (Scharpf 1999, 
Jagers et al. 2016: 3) appears to have a point as it may be the product of citizens’ preferences 
that is provided to citizens. 
However, it is still unanswered how well presented policies for public goods correspond to 
citizens preferences. For example, citizens may have preferences for climate change 
mitigation policies and therefore climate change mitigation policies are represented in party 
manifestos. Yet, the climate mitigation policies represented by parties could be far away from 
living up to the preferences and expectations of citizens. A possible way forward in these 
matters may to interview citizens about their preferences and analyse party manifestos to see 
whether policies correspond to citizens expectations. 
Moreover, if the axiom that democracy creates conditions for public goods provisions by 
aggregating citizens preferences through representation is true, it is thinkable that there may 
be obstacles before decisions about public goods are made. There is still a step between what 
is aggregated by political representative actors and decision-making, e.g. parliamentary 
debates (Matland 1995). This is a possible room for influence from other directions, such as 
from interest groups (Ainsworth 2019; Mann 2016). Future research could compare actual 
political decisions made political representative with what was initially represented in 
manifestos. 
Finally, I only focus on one case in this thesis. That is climate change mitigation policies as 
public goods. More research is needed to further generalize more broadly whether democracy 
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creates conditions for provisions of public goods by preference aggregation through 
representation of preferences. Even though, this appear to be reasonable with the findings in 
this thesis. 
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8. Appendix 
Table 1. Description of variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continuing to the next page 
   
Name Prevalence of environmental 
protection 
Percentage of 'Climate change is a 
serious problem'
Political Corruption Index Real GDP/capita
Code meanofenvir1 avsercc v2x_corr mad_gdppc
Original code per501 v695 (2008), v374 (2009), V546 (2011), 
qa1t_1 (2013 & 2015), qc1t_1 (2017)
v2x_corr mad_gdppc
Scale and 
definition
Interval from 0 (low) to 100 
(high)
"Environmental Protection
General policies in favour of 
protecting the environment, 
fighting climate
change, and other “green” 
policies. For instance:
• General preservation of 
natural resources;
• Preservation of 
countryside, forests, etc.;
• Protection of national 
parks;
• Animal rights."
Interval from 0 (low) to 1 (high)
First, the respondents were first asked:
"In your opinion, which of the following 
do you consider to be the most serious 
problem currently facing the world as a 
whole? Firstly?"
They had to choose between:
"1 Global warming*
2 International terrorism
3 Poverty, lack of food and drinking 
water
4 The spread of an infectious disease
5 A major global economic downturn
6 The proliferation of nuclear weapons
7 Armed conflicts
8 The increasing world population
9 Other (SPONTANEOUS - SPECIFY)
10 DK*"
Second, the respondents were asked: 
"Any others?" or "Which other?"
* The phrase global warming was 
changed after 2009
*DK=Don't know
"Interval from 0 (less corrupt) to 1 (highly 
corrupt)
'The corruption index includes measures 
of six distinct types of corruption
that cover both different areas and levels 
of the polity realm, distinguishing 
between executive,
legislative and judicial corruption. 
Within the executive realm, the 
measures also distinguish
between corruption mostly pertaining to 
bribery and corruption due to 
embezzlement. Finally,
they differentiate between corruption in 
the highest echelons of the executive at 
the level of
the rulers/cabinet on the one hand, and 
in the public sector at large on the other. 
The
measures thus tap into several 
distinguished types of corruption: both 
‘petty’ and ‘grand’;
both bribery and theft; both corruption 
aimed and influencing law making and 
that affecting
implementation."
The real GDP/capita
Reference (Volkens et al. 2018: 17) (European Commission 2013: 1172) (Coppedge et al. 2018: 230; McMann et 
al. 2016)
(Maddison Project 
Database version 
2018 2018; Teorell 
et al. 2019)
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Name Broadcasted campaign 
communication funded by 
interest groups 
Economic influence over 
media content (2008-
2016) 
Public engagement in politics Level of democracy Year
Code v2elpaidig fhp_mcei5 v2dlengage v2x_polyarchy year
Original 
code
v2elpaidig fhp_mcei5 v2dlengage v2x_polyarchy year
Scale and 
definition
Interval from -5 (Not allowed) to 
5 (No restrictions) 
"In this election, were interest 
groups and individuals able to 
run paid campaign ads on 
national broadcast media?"
"Interval from 0 (low 
influence) to 20 (high 
influence)
'[...] examines the 
economic environment 
for the media. This 
includes the structure of 
media ownership;
transparency and 
concentration of 
ownership; the costs of 
establishing media as 
well as of production
and distribution; the 
selective withholding of 
advertising or subsidies 
by the state or other 
actors;
the impact of corruption 
and bribery on content; 
and the extent to which 
the economic situation in
a country impacts the 
development of the 
media."
Interval from -5 (Not engaged) to 5 
(Highly engaged)
"When important policy changes 
are being considered, how wide 
and how independent
are public deliberations?"
"Interval from 0 (less democratic) to 
1 (highly democratic)
'The electoral principle of 
democracy seeks to embody the 
core value of making rulers'
responsive to citizens, achieved 
through electoral competition for 
the electorate’s approval
under circumstances when suffrage 
is extensive; political and civil 
society organizations can
operate freely; elections are clean 
and not marred by fraud or 
systematic irregularities; and
elections affect the composition of 
the chief executive of the country. 
In between elections,
there is freedom of expression and 
an independent media capable of 
presenting alternative
views on matters of political 
relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual 
scheme, electoral democracy
is understood as an essential 
element of any other conception of 
representative democracy —
liberal, participatory, deliberative, 
egalitarian, or some other."
Dummy 
variable 
indicating 
each year
Reference (Coppedge et al., 2018: 61; 
Pemstein et al., 2018)
(Freedom House 2018; 
Teorell et al. 2019: 293)
(Coppedge et al., 2018: 146; 
Pemstein et al., 2018). 
(Coppedge et al. 2018: 40; Teorell 
et al. 2016)
(Teorell et 
al. 2019)
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Table 2. Summary statistics over variables 
  
Prevalence of 
environm
ental 
protection
Percentage of 
'Clim
ate change is a 
serious problem
'
Political 
Corruption Index
Public Political 
engagem
ent
Real 
GDP/capita
Econom
ic 
influence over 
m
edia content 
(2008-2016)
Level of 
dem
ocracy
Broadcasted cam
paign 
com
m
unication funded 
by interest groups
O
bs.
63
62
62
62
55
55
62
62
States
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
M
ean
4.81434
0.4868387
0.191048
1.821396
30410
7.854545
0.8440856
1.289501
Std. Dev.
2.483665
0.1430473
0.1738276
0.5955937
11012.34
3.0757
0.0683352
0.9186106
M
in
1.2853
0.223
0.0059285
0.0011055
14797
4
0.6343308
-1.419576
M
ax
12.441
0.8002
0.7140867
3.168988
56319
15
0.921833
2.769916
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Graph 1. Percentage of 'Climate change is a serious problem' by country over time 
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Graph 2. Time trend over percentage of ‘Climate change is a serious problem’ 
 
Graph 3. Time trend over prevalence of environmental protection in party manifestos 
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Graph 4. Linearity in the focal relationship 
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Table 3. Variance inflation factor unlagged model with ‘Economic influence over media 
content (2008-2016)’ (Teorell et al. 2019) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
      
Economic influence over media content (2008-2016) 5.18 0.193154 
Level of Democracy 3.67 0.27231 
Political Corruption Index 3.39 0.294866 
Real GDP/capita 2.6 0.384537 
Percentage of 'Climate change is a serious problem' 1.75 0.570901 
Year 1.58 0.632591 
Public engagement in politics 1.52 0.657168 
      
Mean VIF 2.81   
 
 
 
Table 4. Variance inflation factor unlagged model with ‘Broadcasted campaign 
communication funded by interest groups’ (Teorell et al. 2019) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
      
Real GDP/capita 3.26 0.306815 
Political Corruption Index 3.05 0.327544 
Level of democracy 2.75 0.363149 
Percentage of 'Climate change is a serious problem' 1.75 0.570733 
Public engagement in politics 1.52 0.657479 
Broadcasted campaign communication funded by interest groups 1.48 0.67375 
Year 1.37 0.72931 
      
Mean VIF 2.17   
 
 
  
61 
 
Table 4. Variance inflation factor one-year lagged model 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
Real GDP/capita 
 
L1. 3.69 0.271302 
Economic influence over media content (2008-2016) 
 
L1. 3.59 0.278534 
Political corruption index 
  
L1. 3.5 0.28549 
Level of democracy 
 
L1. 2.49 0.401911 
Percentage of 'Climate change is a serious problem' 
  
L1. 2.12 0.471585 
Year 
  
L1. 1.5 0.666401 
Public political engagement 
 
L1. 1.48 0.676297 
   
Mean VIF 2.62 
 
 
Table 5. Variance inflation factor one-year lagged model 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
Economic influence over media content (2008-2016) 
 
L2. 3.79 0.26383 
Real GDP/capita 
 
L2. 3.48 0.287262 
Political corruption index 
  
L2. 3.46 0.28905 
Level of democracy 
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L2. 2.67 0.374675 
Year 
  
L2. 1.68 0.59442 
Percentage of 'Climate change is a serious problem' 
  
L2. 1.61 0.621223 
Public political engagement 
 
L2. 1.6 0.626687 
   
Mean VIF 2.61 
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Graph 6. Cook’s D one-year lag model 
 
Graph 7. Cook’s D two-year lag model 
 
  
64 
 
Graph 8. Leverage one-year lag model 
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Graph 9. Leverage two-year lag model 
 
 
Graph 10. Deviation one-year lag model
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Graph 11. Deviation two-year lag model 
 
 
  
67 
 
Table 5. Correlation matrix, one-year lagged models 
  
Prevalence of 
environm
ent
al protection, 
1-year lag
Percentage of 
'Clim
ate change is 
a serious problem
', 
1-year lag
Political 
corruption 
index, 1-year lag
Public political 
engagem
ent, 
1-year lag
Real 
G
D
P/capita, 1-
year lag
Econom
ic 
influence over 
m
edia content 
(2008-2016), 1-
year lag
Level of 
dem
ocracy, 1-
year lag
Year, 1-year 
lag
Prevalence of environm
ental protection, 1-year lag
1
Percentage of 'Clim
ate change is a serious problem
', 1-year lag
-0.122
1
Political corruption index, 1-year lag
-0.9922
0.1654
1
Public political engagem
ent, 1-year lag
0.9682
0.0838
-0.9685
1
Real G
D
P/capita, 1-year lag
0.6558
0.5636
-0.6668
0.8231
1
Econom
ic influence over m
edia content (2008-2016), 1-year lag
-0.7722
0.4792
0.8421
-0.742
-0.4495
1
Level of dem
ocracy, 1-year lag
0.853
0.0936
-0.7813
0.7962
0.502
-0.3387
1
Year, 1-year lag
-0.1159
0.9764
0.1332
0.1164
0.6361
0.3569
-0.0101
1
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Table 6. Correlation matrix, two-year lagged models 
 
Prevalence of 
environm
enta
l protection, 2-
year lag
Percentage of 
'Clim
ate change is 
a serious 
problem
', 2-year 
lag
Political 
corruption 
index, 2-year 
lag
Public political 
engagem
ent, 2-
year lag
Real GDP/capita, 
2-year lag
Econom
ic 
influence over 
m
edia content 
(2008-2016), 2-
year lag
Level of 
dem
ocracy, 
2-year lag
Year, 2-
year lag
Prevalence of environm
ental protection, 2-year lag
1
Percentage of 'Clim
ate change is a serious problem
', 2-year lag
0.7694
1
Political corruption index, 2-year lag
-0.5634
-0.2585
1
Public political engagem
ent, 2-year lag
0.8163
0.7807
-0.8043
1
Real GDP/capita, 2-year lag
0.9717
0.8612
-0.62
0.9175
1
Econom
ic influence over m
edia content (2008-2016), 2-year lag
-0.9116
-0.4419
0.5752
-0.6136
-0.8036
1
Level of dem
ocracy, 2-year lag
-0.1623
-0.7509
-0.0878
-0.4268
-0.3498
-0.2574
1
Year, 2-year lag
-0.1218
0.3442
-0.303
0.4418
0.1153
0.4352
-0.7343
1
